When news appeared in mid-July that the BC Ferries corporation planned to award contracts to build three new super-sized ships to foreign shipyards, there was nary a peep in the local media about the painful irony. BC Ferries vice president Mark Stefanson told CBC, "The yards in Canada no longer have the capability to build the large vessels that we need." Kevin Falcon, BC transportation minister, backed BC Ferries' position, suggesting that awarding the contracts to local shipbuilders would “automatically take away any desire to have to be competitive."

And so, at a price of $170 million each, up to three ferries will be imported from either Germany or Finland, for a total price tag of $510 million, and possibly over $637 million, if Ottawa does not waive a tariff on foreign-built ships.

The irony is that Falcon is minister in a government that won power after the previous NDP administration was sunk by the fiasco surrounding the construction of three home-made “Fast Ferries” that cost the government $450 million. Two of those ferries were put into service only shortly before being sold to the company that built them at a fraction of their construction costs, resulting in a complete loss of nearly half a billion tax payer dollars.

BC Ferries is owner and operator of 40 passenger ships making 46 ports of call on 25 routes up and down Canada's west coast. Until now, all its craft have been built by the BC shipbuilding industry. Nearly all major maritime countries, like Canada and including Germany and Finland, have their own shipbuilding industries that are all protected by tariffs against importations. The plan to buy new ferries from abroad not only breaks with the BC Ferry tradition, but it's nearly unprecedented for a major maritime country to buy ships from abroad.

Though plagued by scandals, including a highly-publicized police search of the Premier's home, it was the Fast Ferry boondoggle that has earned credit for bringing down the Glen Clark government. A report by BC's auditor general found that poor governance lay at the heart of the failure of the fast ferry building project. Poor planning plus poor risk analysis exposed the project to failing confidence in those it needed the support of, including management at BC Ferries and the BC public, George L Morfitt found in his 1999 report.

But in theory, the fast ferry project was well-inspired, and might have worked with more competent management. Because BC Ferries carry passengers over salt-water routes of some length, their craft are subject to safety inspections and condemnation decisions by international authorities, in keeping with maritime shipping treaties Canada is a signatory to. As early as 1990, inspectors noted that at least three of BC Ferries' largest ships would require replacement soon to avoid condemnation. There was, and remains, no way around the fact that important parts of the coastal fleet need replacing fast.

The BC shipbuilding industry had long ago stopped being profitable without major subsidies and sweetened contracts to build ships for the BC Ferries fleet. It was capable in the mid-90s of supplying the fleet with new large ships, but only at great cost to the public and with no good return on the investment needed to upgrade the shipbuilding yards.

There is no market internationally for the kinds of ships the local industry was capable of producing, because all major maritime countries are equally capable of building similar ships domestically as well. Thus, if the local industry were contracted to build three of the usual ships, the new industrial infrastructure required would be a dead loss in the absence of any export market for additional ships.

Thus the decision was made to try rejuvenating the BC shipbuilding industry and making it profitable again by having BC Ferries contract the local industry to produce three models of a new kind of ship for which there was potentially a market into which more craft could be sold. The new kind of ship was called the PacifiCat Fast Ferry, and was basically a catamaran with two powerful water jets down the sides to power it.

The design and building plans originated with an Australian firm. Those plans called for the ship to be built one side at a time, then joined with the superstructure down the middle. This produced warps in the decks. Additionally, to avoid rebuilding ramps at the ports, the first ship carried its ramp for cars on its door, a fatal flaw that weighed the ship down in front, necessitating ballast on the back, sinking the ship too far down in the water for the water jets to lift it out and achieve the planing effect that made the ferry go fast.

The second ship was a prototype as well, since it was built with a completely original concept, putting it together in parts cut sideways like slices of bread in a loaf, solving the warping problem. The problem with the ramp was solved as well , so that the second ship, though a prototype too , was far superior to the first. The third ship built was the first production model, and its construction employed all the latest thinking, plus it took advantage of building blocks already set up in the construction of the second ship. The third ship, however, did not get its sea trials before the government was pulled down. It might have proven itself a fast and efficient ship capable of doing everything the project promised.

If it had, its success may well have lead to international orders, since there is a market for fast ferries, but few locations where the expertise to build them can be found. BC Ferry passengers have sour memories of the first two ships, which were slow and cumbersome. Had they experienced the third one, the first production ship, they might have had a different experience to report.

More importantly, had politics not intervened, and had the new government allowed the third ship to be tested and put into service, more might have been built locally to supply BC Ferries' needs.

There is no question the project was a boondoggle. But a more forethoughtful and less jealous Liberal government might have put pride behind it and allowed the third vessel to demonstrate its potential value. Then at least we would know for sure today whether Canada, and in particular, BC, has the capacity and expertise to build large and efficient ships.

Instead, a further $510 million, and possibly $637 million, will be added to the already staggering bill of $450 million for the necessary re-supplying of BC Ferry's inventory of ships. And the present government is looking at the same set of problems they denied the previous government faced in deciding what to do.

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